

**BUILDING FOR JAMAICA'S FUTURE: UNITY,
PHILOSOPHY AND ORGANISATION**

**THE APPRAISAL OF THE PEOPLE'S NATIONAL
PARTY'S PERFORMANCE IN THE 2007 JAMAICAN
GENERAL ELECTIONS:**

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PREFACE

The loss of the 2007 Jamaican General Elections by the People's National Party after an unprecedented eighteen years in office provides a moment for sober reflection and consideration. The margin of defeat – less than 3000 votes nationally and two seats preventing a tie in parliament – is remarkable and ran counter to the views of many of the pundits in the days preceding the vote. Yet, in the first-past-the-post Westminster system, a narrow loss is a defeat nonetheless. It is a time for considering what might have been 'if only' this or that administrative or political decision had been taken; but it is also a time for a deeper reflection that points in the direction of healing, reinvention and renewal. The thrust of this report, it is hoped, captures both of these dimensions.

Some six weeks ago, in the immediate wake of the Elections and the decision of the Party, this Appraisal Team met with representatives of the Executive and were given the daunting task of producing a review and appraisal of the Party's performance in the campaign and the Elections in time for the meeting of the NEC in the third week in November. I can say with some satisfaction that we have completed the main body of that report.

Beyond the obvious time constraints, the task has not been an easy one. We began with the fairly evident observation that we would have to look at a sample of constituencies and twelve were eventually chosen. However, getting to these twelve and meeting with all the requisite officers of the Party in the rainiest rainy season in many a year, proved equally daunting. We eventually met with seven constituencies in some depth, while receiving reports from others and from a number of constituencies that were not a part of our original sample. Despite these shortfalls, the methodologists will no doubt agree that an over ten percent sample is more than adequate to provide useful insights into the perspectives of the membership of the Party. A further aspect of the report, agreed on at the very first meeting, was to commission a national poll to solicit views on the Party and the campaign that go beyond those coming from within the Party itself. As events unfolded, it was clear that this would not be ready before the date of the NEC meeting in November. We have therefore agreed to present its findings as a report in its own right, in which the Appraisal Team would reconvene and append its comments to the actual poll results. This has also given us reason to pause and consider more broadly the nature and format of the report.

One of the recurring comments coming from our conversations with Party members is expressed in the fear that after giving their heartfelt comments and opinions on the elections and the future of the Party, that the Report, no matter how well intentioned, might simply be tabled and put on the shelf to gather the proverbial dust. We start with the assumption that the Executive and the Party, while under no obligation to agree with all the proposals made, are interested in generating a conversation and out of it, consensus and regeneration in the Party and its organs. As such, we suggest the following sequence of events as an appropriate approach to the further dissemination and exploration of this report:

1. Appraisal Team Report submitted to Executive.
2. Executive considers Report and takes it to NEC
3. Appraisal Team submits National Poll and Report to Executive.
4. Party considers Report and decides on implementation.
5. Implementation.

Essentially we are suggesting that the Report be considered as a process that is not complete until, after due deliberation and modification, the accepted proposals are implemented.

I wish to end with an expression of gratitude, shared by all members of the Team for the privilege of being involved in this project. Despite the expenditure of significant personal time and resources, it was worth every minute. It gave us a deep insight into the heart and soul of the People's National Party; its officers, members and supporters, their hopes and dreams for a better Jamaica and their vision that the PNP is the central vehicle in that journey. This in the end is what the entire adventure is about and why we are all involved.

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1.0 BACKGROUND TO THE APPRAISAL

1.1 Rationale and Structure

Following the Jamaican General Elections held on September 3, 2007, the current results are that the People's National Party holds 28 seats. Of the 34 formerly PNP seats, 27 were retained and the Party won an additional seat. The JLP holds 32 seats. Overall the victory of the JLP is considered the narrowest by seat count in Jamaica's electoral history. The Party acknowledged that there are external factors including the concerns about the functioning of the electoral system and the level of funding which the JLP expended not only on their campaign but directly targeting voters in certain battleground constituencies. Notwithstanding this, the Party concluded importantly that there should be a focus on the review of the elements over which the Party had direct control.

To undertake the appraisal exercise the People's National Party agreed to assemble a multi-disciplinary external working team to undertake the field work, including focus groups and other surveys, and prepare a report on the findings of the review process.

The persons selected to serve on the Appraisal Team are considered to be independent persons, though sympathetic and supportive and who are familiar with the broad principles and objectives of the People's National Party. They are not involved in any of the formal structures of the Party and had no role in the development of policy and programmes for the September 3, 2007 General Elections.

The Appraisal Team consisted of five (5) professionals drawn from academia and the private sector. The recommendations were signed off by the Officers of the Party, the Party Executive and subsequently presented to the September 23rd 2007 meeting of the National Executive.

Brian Meeks, Professor of Social and Political Change and Director of the Centre for Caribbean Thought in the Department of Government, UWI, Mona, was named as the Chairperson of the Appraisal Team.

Richard Crawford, Lecturer at the University of the West Indies in Politics, Public Administration & Governance, is a political commentator, analyst and former Special Assistant to Prime Minister Michael Manley. Mr. Crawford served as Deputy Chairperson for the Appraisal Team.

Winston Davis For retired Assistant Registrar at the University of the West Indies, Mona and former Ambassador to Cuba.

Mark Golding was recently named by the People's National Party as a Senator. He is an Attorney-at-law and partner of the firm Hart Muirhead Fatta, and also has extensive experience in investment banking having been a founder of Dehring Bunting & Golding Limited.

Aubyn Hill, due to work constraints was unable to participate in the process.

The Team received logistical support from Maureen Webber and her team. Maureen Webber is a Development Consultant, Principal of the consulting firm Development Options Ltd. She also served for three years as Deputy General Secretary with responsibility for Organising and Political Education.

In addition to the Appraisal Team the Party named an Appraisal Committee which included membership from its Regions, its arms and affiliates, in addition to a representative of the Parish Managers and Campaign Managers who were involved in the 2007 General Elections.

1.2 Scope of the Work

Six broad areas for possible review were proposed:

- Candidate Identification
- External Environment
- Campaign Strategic Planning, Programme & Management
- Message, Marketing & Media
- Fundraising & Financing
- Election Results

The appraisal was expected to include a review of the candidate identification and support process; and the process of developing and articulating the Campaign Strategy at the national and local level. It would determine the extent to which there was a comprehensive national campaign programme and the necessary campaign management and organization to direct the strategy and implement the programme.

The appraisal was expected to assess the process of developing the Party's campaign platform, the impact it had on the electorate and the overall communications and marketing strategy. The Appraisal would further assess the effectiveness of the fundraising process and the extent to which budgeting supported campaign strategy. Finally, in order to assist in determining how the above elements affected the results, there was to be a detailed review of the voting results, with breakouts for Divisions, where possible by income cohorts.

At its first meeting in early October, it was apparent to both the Appraisal Team and the officers of the Party present that in order to present a report at the required time of the third week in November, a survey of the Party across the sixty constituencies would be unrealistic. The target instead was to review a sample of constituencies for a more focused report that would include recommendations for action in all critical areas and for presentation at the November NEC.

Please see Appendix V.1 for detailed scope of work of the Appraisal Process.

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2.0 THE APPRAISAL PROCESS

2.1 Research Process

The Appraisal Team used a series of research and data gathering techniques, including focus groups with various Party members and supporters; interviews with senior Party Officers. In addition Campaign Managers, Candidates, Cluster Managers and Party Workers were interviewed. Survey instruments were used to collect data; detailed analysis of voting results and comparisons with historical data in addition to a national poll, work on which got underway only recently.

Specifically there were three (3) components:

Qualitative Data Collection

- Conducting interviews with Officers and the National Directorate of the Campaign
- Conducting interviews with workers at all levels, candidates, campaign managers, cluster managers, campaign/election day workers
- Conducting focus groups with special interest groups, voters, media etc.

Quantitative Data Collection

- Collecting quantitative data from Party workers, including cluster managers and campaign managers
- A National Poll [Work began on November 16th 2007]
- Reviewing and analyzing data results for both the 2002 and 2007 election.

Documentary Research

- The review of relevant documents of the Party, the EOJ, etc.

2.2 Field Research

i) Selection of Constituencies

There was consensus that it would not be possible to conduct detailed field research in all sixty (60) Constituencies. The Appraisal Team developed a list of some fifteen Constituencies which it felt had experiences which reflected the majority of the constituencies. From this, a final listing of ten was submitted to the Party Executive and to the Party Appraisal Committee. This led to

suggestions for an additional two (2) constituencies to be added to the list. The twelve Constituencies were:

Region 1

North West St. Ann

Region 2

Western St. Mary

Region 3

South East St. Andrew
Eastern St. Andrew
West Central St. Andrew

Region 4

South East St. Catherine
North Clarendon
North West Clarendon

Region 5

Central Manchester
South East St. Elizabeth

Region 6

East Hanover
West Central St. James.

The Regional Representatives on the Appraisal Committee were expected to assist the Appraisal Team in communicating with the selected Constituencies. For a rationale of the twelve constituencies selected please see Appendix 'V.3'.

It was agreed that Regions would ask Constituencies not included in the sample to conduct their own Appraisal and provide this feedback to the Appraisal Team. Packages with copies of the instruments were prepared and dispatched throughout the Party by the Secretariat.

ii) Survey Instruments

The Team developed survey instruments to be completed by Campaign Managers and Cluster Managers from the twelve Constituencies. The instruments were 'piloted' at the Campaign Managers joint session and received feedback from those present including representatives of the

arms and affiliates and the regions. Please see Appendix V.4 & V.5 for copies of the survey instruments.

iii) Interviews

The Team members conducted ‘one on one’ interviews with the Officers of the Party, including the Party President, the General Secretary, three of the four elected Vice Presidents, the Party Chairman and former Party President. In addition there were individual interviews with all three members of the National Campaign Committee – the Campaign Director, Deputy Campaign Director and Campaign Manager – which had the responsibility for directing and managing the election. Interviews were also held with the two Campaign Administrators.

Please see Appendix V.2 for a schedule of interviews.

iv) Joint Sessions/Focus Groups/Submissions

These were conducted with:

- **Campaign Managers** - six of the sample of twelve Constituencies attended this session. Campaign Managers were asked to complete a survey instrument and subsequently participated in an extensive discussion around the key issues of campaign strategy, direction and management. The session shared lessons learnt and best practices.
- **Candidates** – A total of five (5) Candidates of the selected twelve (12) constituencies participated in an in-depth focus group session. The emphasis was on sharing experiences, best practices and lessons learnt.
- **Cluster Managers & Workers**
The team held meetings with seven (7) of the twelve constituencies, which were targeted for detailed review. The seven constituencies were:
 - ▲ West Central St. Andrew
 - ▲ Eastern St. Andrew
 - ▲ South East St. Andrew
 - ▲ South East St. Catherine

- ▲ Central Manchester
- ▲ Eastern Hanover
- ▲ West Central St. James

Sessions were held with both Party Workers and Cluster Managers. The Cluster Managers were asked to complete the survey instrument. A total of fifty-five of these were completed. In addition to the seven above, Region 4 also organised a session which brought together Cluster Managers and some Campaign Managers from five St Catherine constituencies for an in-depth interview session.

The time available for the completion of the field work, compounded by extensive periods of heavy rainfall made it extremely difficult to complete in-depth reviews of all the chosen Constituencies. Several were also in the process of preparing their own reports. The exercise, however, was conducted in an atmosphere of openness and frankness. Let no one suggest that PNP comrades are afraid to express the strongest possible views, whether supportive or critical of local and national leadership, or of the Party in general. Please see Appendix “II.3” for a summary of the results from the surveys.

- **Middle Income Voters** – A total of thirteen (13) Party supporters with an age range of 32 – 54, and a mix of seven female and 6 males from varied professional groups participated in a focus group session. The group shared their views on the Party’s performance and made recommendations for the next steps.

- **Submissions**

The Appraisal also sought input from the Arms and Affiliates of the Party. The PNP YO, PNP WM and the NWU. Both the PNP YO and the NWU were asked and agreed to schedule ‘focus group’ sessions of their primary constituents, the Appraisal Team would attend once scheduled. The PNP YO President had confirmed as session however, the assigned member of the Appraisal Team went to the venue and despite waiting for 60 minutes no one arrived. The NWU representative to the Appraisal Committee contacted the Team’s co-ordinator, to schedule a date however at this time the field work was completed and it was agreed that he would speak with the Chairman of the Appraisal Team.

Unfortunately the PNP WM Representative was unable to continue her tenure. We were advised of the replacement and did make efforts to contact.

A final appeal was sent to all Arms and Affiliates. Submissions were received from PNP UK and the Jamaica National Movement, Inc.

In addition Party supporters did informal canvassing to gather views of voters and forwarded these to the Appraisal Team.

Please see Appendix “V.2’ for a schedule of interviews.

iv) National Poll - The Appraisal Team viewed the commissioning of a National Poll as a critical component in the Appraisal Process. The team in consultation with the Appraisal Committee agreed that the issues to be explored in the National Poll would include, among others:

- ▲ Why persons voted for the Party
- ▲ Why they did not vote for the Party
- ▲ Leadership
- ▲ Performance
- ▲ The role of violence
- ▲ Perceived Corruption
- ▲ Money and its impact on the election results
- ▲ Gender patterns of voting
- ▲ Age patterns of voting
- ▲ Social/class patterns of voting
- ▲ Geographical patterns of voting

The results of the Poll will be available in the weeks following the submission of this document. The Appraisal Team will, however, reconvene and submit its comments on the poll findings as part of the overall report.

3. NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE PRELUDE, THE ELECTIONS AND THE RESULTS

On December 12, 1944 the first elections under full adult suffrage were held in Jamaica. The JLP won 22 seats, the PNP won 5 and Independents won 5 seats. In 1949 the PNP won 13 seats with 43.5% of the vote whilst the JLP won 17 seats with 42.7% of the vote. Since 1944 the PNP has won 8 National elections and the JLP 7. The two parties have basically rotated in power for roughly two terms each between 1944 and 1983.

After winning in 1989 the PNP effectively broke this two term cycle by achieving four consecutive victories over the last 18 years, the last in 2002.

After its defeat in the 1967 General Elections, the Party conducted an appraisal of the reasons for the loss. This led to significant changes in the Party's organisation and structure and contributed, among other factors, to the stunning success in the 1972 polls. Following the traumatic defeat in 1980, there was a sustained programme of political education and the re-building of the election machinery which led to a very strong and committed party that won the elections of 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2002.

After the 1992 Presidential election it was "hard to manage" but former President Patterson focused on the challenges and party unity because "I have a government to run".

By 2001 in the NE St Ann bye-election, there was the first crack in the dyke. Voluntarism showed signs of dramatic decline. The party structure and organization began to weaken, affected, certainly, by the absence of a political education programme since 1992.

After the long and expensive 2006 Presidential campaign, it was felt that the party was "in an unprecedented positive position, in terms of national popularity. It did well for the party in terms of generating energy, fervour and exuberance. We could not lose an election at that point". The Party Leader had a national popularity rating of 78% amongst the electorate at this time.

However, "let's face it if you have an 80% rating in a plural democracy there is only one way for it to go and that is down. So why the long wait?" The Party began to suffer from post-Presidential contest disunity, problems associated with the re-verification process for some 260,000 potential

electors, a turbulent candidate selection process and lack of money. Organizational weaknesses and a lack of cohesiveness came home to haunt the Party.

Then there was the cement crisis, the prolonged Whitehouse Sandals issue, the voluntary resignation of the Party's Treasurer Dr. Vin Lawrence, the attacks on the media and attacks by the media. Yet at first, the Party remained ahead of the JLP in national polls.

The PNP had a highly successful Annual Conference in September 2006 which was partially eclipsed by the Trafigura affair. Trafigura had devastating consequences for the Party and led to a rapid decline in popular support.

The JLP which had been campaigning, expecting an early election, used the Trafigura issue to put more pressure on the Party and Government. They were able to hold a very successful conference in November and began to emerge as a genuine alternative for many, especially as their campaign became more vigorous and aggressive

As the Party presented 58 of its candidates in November, Cricket World Cup unfolded. With the polls showing the PNP still ahead, there was speculation about a December election. This, however, never materialized as there was great concern about the state of the Party's organization, campaign machinery and the absence of money.

By March 2007 the situation improved. With the Budget Debate and the first anniversary milestone of the election of Portia Simpson Miller as President, the position in the polls improved and another victory seemed possible.

The JLP, however, were not sitting idly by and stepped up its campaign. Millions of dollars were being spent on a well coordinated media blitz and "despite anything that people might say the questions of colour, race, social and income status still loom large in Jamaica". The JLP campaign began to influence popular opinion and gradually tilted the party standings in its favour.

In spite of all of this, the Party's Half Way Tree meeting in early July was a phenomenal event, with some suggesting the largest meeting in modern Jamaican politics. This surge among core supporters could have led to an end of month election to keep the momentum in favour of the

Party. At this time the Party had a minimum lead of six percent over the JLP in all the credible poll findings.

However, the August 27 date made the campaign too long, deflated the comrades, put more stress on an exhausted organization, opened the door for more JLP money to flow to the electorate, gave them more time to decimate the PNP with their media campaign, conflicted with established back-to-school traditions and opened us up to the possibility of a hurricane, which did come.

After Hurricane Dean, there was the confusion surrounding the change of date of the election, the date for the opening of schools, the impasse between the government and the EOJ, the declaration of a state of public emergency, the handling of hurricane relief efforts, the seeming confusion between the Government and Party leaving the field wide open for the JLP to campaign and capitalize on these events.

The elections of September 3 ended with a 31 to 29 seat victory for the JLP, moved to 33 to 27 and standing at the moment at 32 JLP, 28 PNP. There were 405,215 votes for the JLP and 402,275 for the PNP. The JLP received 2940 more votes than the PNP in one of the most heavily financed elections in Jamaican history. This, incidentally, is also probably the most heavily researched, the most media intensive, and the one with the most widely disseminated knowledge about the electorate's probable intentions. The use of selective "surgical violence" and intimidation was, while not unique, nonetheless characteristic of these elections. Approximately 40% or 528,734 voters of the total electorate of 1,336,214 did not vote.

In 2002 the PNP won 34 seats with 396,590 or 51.6% of the votes and the JLP won 26 seats with 360,718 or 46.9% of the votes. In 2002, 59.06% of the electors voted and a similar 40.94% did not vote. Importantly, in 2007 the PNP gained more votes than it did in 2002 in WR. St Andrew (817), WC St Andrew (439), ER St Andrew (1586), W. Portland (1173), SE St Mary (744), WC St James (1236), SE St Elizabeth (913), yet lost all these seats. Increased majorities were also registered in SC St. Catherine (1663), EC St. Catherine (1347), SE ST Catherine (487), C. Westmoreland (1000), and N. Trelawny (1000); whilst E. Hanover's increase of 878 was just enough to take that seat from the JLP.

The issue of incumbency in this election was of great interest, as polls indicated that a number of incumbents from both parties, were in danger of losing their seats. The public was dissatisfied with their performance and the PNP MP's had the added difficulty of "being in office too long" with what some argued was little to show for their representation. By July 7, 2007 the Party's assessment showed a rating of 10 safe PNP seats and 10 to the advantage of the PNP. These were all won. These ratings also showed 19 seats for the JLP, which they won. The remaining 21 battleground seats showed that incumbents won in N.E. Manchester, (Dean Peart); South Manchester, (Michael Peart); N.W. St. Catherine (Bobby Pickersgill); S.C St. Catherine, (Sharon Hay-Webster); and S.E. St. Andrew, (Maxine Henry-Wilson). These wins are attributed to detailed, meticulous and hard-working campaigns from proven candidates.

The Party was also able to retain S.E. St. Catherine, S.E. St. Ann, Central Westmoreland and Central Manchester again primarily because of excellent hard working candidates and a united team. D. K. Duncan captured Eastern Hanover from the JLP for the same reasons. The Party lost West & S. E. St. Mary after hard fought campaigns; S.E and S.W. St. Elizabeth were lost in part due to internal divisions and highly contested candidate selections. The North and North West Clarendon seats were part of our original sample, but we were unable to speak with the candidates and workers and cannot therefore arrive at a definitive conclusion as to the causes of defeat.

In the immediate pre-election campaign, the Party commissioned three national surveys, one Gleaner survey and 74 surveys in 46 constituencies which showed: a downward trend of support for Portia, tight constituency races and the clear indication that it would be a close election. The Party members and supporters in the weeks before the election did tremendous work "however, the fact that we came so close both in terms of seats and votes, suggests that we could have won without making so many mistakes".

That statement is in dire contrast to the pundits who predicted a landslide for the opposition, 45-15, 50 -10, or even as much as 54 – 6. Were some of these pundits part of a clever strategy by the JLP to demoralise PNP voters? Certainly there was evidence of some of the classic techniques of dis-information, and plain "yellow journalism" in elements of the JLP's media campaign. The mysterious shooting up of the JLP candidate's car in Tavern (E. St Andrew) and the too quick and 'spontaneous' response of the JLP propaganda apparatus is one fairly suspicious instance. Numerous questions remain to be posed: Why did the JLP with all the money, media and the

powerful slogan “Time for a change”, come so close to losing after 18 years in power for the PNP? Why did some of the greatest beneficiaries of PNP policies and encouragement, openly support and finance the JLP campaign? This is part of the purpose of this appraisal.

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4.0 THE INTERNAL FACTORS BEHIND THE PARTY'S PERFORMANCE

Beyond the disappointment of losing the 2007 general elections, a total assessment of the Party's performance must address centrally, the closeness of the final result in both total votes and seat count. Two questions emerge from this. After some four years of JLP campaigning, much of that time without any competition in the field, with unprecedented, lavish campaign expenditure at both the national and constituency levels, after all the scandals directed against the Government and the Party, most of all, after a record eighteen years in power, what accounts for the narrowness of the JLP victory? A second question, however, must inevitably be posed. After the overwhelming sentiments indicating support for the new Prime Minister, after the concomitant improvement in the PNP's standings in the polls in the middle of 2006, what accounts for the precipitous fall in support and corresponding recovery of the JLP to the point where it became once again competitive and actually able to win? The answers to these two questions as posed to the leadership, membership and supporters, sheds significant light on the reasons for the Party's overall performance. There was, somewhat surprisingly, consensus on many issues, though by no means on all.

4.1 The Media/Public Relations Campaign

There was strong support for the view that the Party's media campaign was the worst in recent history. It failed to develop distinctive and effective slogans. The slogan 'a vote for X is a vote for Portia' not only failed to convince many hard core PNP supporters who felt it undervalued the local candidate and the Party, but turned off others, particularly from the middle classes and professional strata. Further, by focusing almost exclusively on Portia, it provided the opposition with a single image to tarnish, in order to bring the entire Party down. 'Not Changing Course' was seen by the PNP hard core as a fighting slogan, but by many others as an unwillingness to consider any changes at all and thus a failure of the imagination, at a time when what was required was new and imaginative thinking.

The debate between the two party leaders was seen unanimously as a major loss for the PNP. Many felt that it would have been better to suffer the negative publicity of not participating rather than suffer what was seen to be an inevitable defeat on Golding's strongest ground. The Party failed to capitalise on the real gains made in the social and economic spheres as well as the significant advances in national infrastructure during its eighteen years in power.

The actual media and public relations organization was severely criticized. The failure to utilize tried and tested individuals, the absence of a press centre at PNP HQ, the absence of a clear and authoritative Party representative to manage day-to-day relations and information flow with the media, the failure to utilize the new media, the Web, You Tube, etc., the inability to respond effectively and creatively to JLP attack ads, the inability to produce catchy and effective jingles and the failure to present the successful policies of the Government, were among the criticisms raised. There was some improvement in the last two weeks of the campaign, but by then it was an instance of 'too little, too late' as the JLP had already dominated the airwaves and effectively won the media war.

See Appendix I.1 & I.2 for more details.

4.2 The Presidential Elections

The vast majority (80% Cluster Managers and Party Workers) agreed that the Presidential elections had a profound effect on the campaign, but there were different emphases. There was an almost unanimous feeling that its prolonged and intensely competitive nature wasted energy and money that was urgently needed for the general elections. There is a strong current throughout the party that deplores the entrance of money and US-style electioneering that began in recent Vice Presidential races and was carried over with gusto into the Presidential election. There is the widespread feeling that had the presidential race been more confined within the Party then some of the excesses of rhetoric that has led to subsequent tensions and provided damaging Opposition ad content might have been avoided. This is not to deny that there is very strong criticism of those individuals and groups perceived as having contributed to an exacerbation of differences and tensions within the Party.

4.3 Disunity

Most of those interviewed felt that disunity played some role in the defeat. This took a number of different forms. Some felt that other leaders of the PNP did not support Portia by appearing with her on the campaign trail and did not participate in the campaign as energetically as they should have. Others argued that the nature of the campaign, focused on a single person, effectively excluded other leaders, who became redundant. The symbolic persistence of two colours, orange and yellow, was often invoked as evidence of the failure to reunite the Party after the bruising Presidential campaign. Whatever the ultimate truth, the very existence of these often diametrically

opposed perspectives, proves the point that differences and tensions persist at the heart of the Party.

See Appendix “II.2” for results of Cluster manager survey.

4.4 Campaign Organization

There was a strong view coming from the constituencies as well as the leadership that campaign organization from the centre was seriously flawed. There were too many managers and no one was clearly in charge. The Party was very late in setting up an administrative apparatus, which in the end was never able to fully manage the elections from the centre. Candidate selection in the months leading up to the election was slow and often poorly managed, leading to public brawls and wrong choices in some instances. The enumeration and re-verification exercises had not gone well and the Party as a whole was not on top of the new EOJ process of continual enumeration. Vin Lawrence was often identified by name and his absence was felt. Unlike when Vin was in charge, the typical narrative goes, the ship appeared to have more than one captain and unfocused decision-making and action were the result.

4.5 Trafigura

High on most lists among senior Party Officers was the notion that the 2006 Trafigura affair was critical in tarnishing the party’s chances. Coming out of the Presidential elections the party was unassailable in the polls and would have won an election handily. It was felt that the affair was handled badly and the persons at the centre were not sufficiently sidelined from the Party’s business and life. After Trafigura, the popularity of both the Leader and the Party plummeted. The fact of being in power for eighteen years and thus the foundation for the powerful slogan ‘time for a change’ re-emerged. The Party after the post-election honeymoon was once again vulnerable as the New Year began.

4.6 Timing of the Elections

There is a broad perception, perhaps consensus, that the timing of the election played a major role in the defeat. There are two views; the previously mentioned one is that the election should have been held in 2006 before Trafigura and this would have ensured victory. The second view is that given the second 2007 budget presentation and the boost in the polls that followed, after the huge Half Way Tree election announcement meeting, a date called for the end of July would still have led to victory. Late August carried the nation back to school and into the hurricane season. The

extended period also allowed the JLP's advantage of significantly greater financial resources to have an even greater effect on the result. Further, the artificial break around Emancipation/Independence threw the entire campaign out of stride. In the end, Hurricane Dean did come and the Government's tepid response to relief and apparent prevarication on a new date, served to further undermine support for the Party.

4.7 Philosophy and Direction

A related cluster of comments from across the spectrum and directed more at the Party, though with reference to the campaign itself, suggest that the Party is in danger of losing its way. There is the talk of the death of voluntarism in the Party; the all-too-frequent association of younger Party members with alleged financial irregularities; the failure to develop and implement a determined policy to win young people; the absence of a philosophy, or even a set of guiding principles appropriate to the twenty first century; the need for a Party School, as functioned in the nineteen eighties; and critically, the need to breathe new life into the Group structure. Broadly summarized, there is a strong perception coming from within that the PNP has lost, or is losing its soul. But herein lays the rub. The very existence of a healthy body of critical opinion is the best indicator that despite the obvious truth in many of these comments, all is certainly not lost and there is cause for hope.

4.8 Leadership

The clear view of the majority is that with any other leader, the Party would have done much worse in the General Elections. When Campaign Managers were asked 'what was the major positive component in the election campaign?' the largest response, some 71.4% felt that a visit from the party leader was 'extremely effective'. A further 14.3% felt it had some effect. When Cluster Managers and Party Workers were asked what impact the Party Leader had on the constituency campaign, 77.8% were very positive and a further 16.7% positive. This compares with 5.6% and 38.9% who felt that a visit from Vice Presidents was, respectively, very positive or positive.

There was a view that having lost the election the leadership should change, but this was in the minority. This clear indication of the continuing existence of a popular mandate for the incumbent

Leader did not, however, prevent the expression of a variety of implicit and explicit criticisms of the Leader and, more generally, the top leadership.

Apart from the error in the election timing, there was the view that the road plan for Portia was ill-conceived. Too many repeat trips were made to constituencies that were un-winnable, while others with real possibilities had no visits at all. Portia's trips started too late in the day and often reached the destination long after the crowd had already dissipated. The insistence on meeting and greeting people individually reduced the number of people who could be reached, as compared to more emphasis on spot meetings.

The overemphasis on the Leader, others argued, undermined the traditional role of collective leadership in the campaign. In the past, a number of leaders would spread out and thus maximize coverage, whereas in the 2007 campaign, the only real draw was the Leader. Some of these comments have to do with campaigning and leadership style, and are debateable. Others suggest a genuine concern and desire to reinstate more collective forms of campaign and party leadership that are perceived to be threatened.

In summary, the view of the clear majority is that the Presidential election is over and, with the narrow loss of the General Elections, Portia Simpson Miller is the legitimate leader of the PNP. However, for Simpson Miller's leadership to be a success it requires compromises on all sides and for everyone to put the interests of the Party first. This is the only approach that will help to avoid a long period in the political wilderness.

5.0 THE EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS

5.1 The JLP Campaign.

The JLP conducted a superior campaign which benefited in no small measure from the adaptation of electioneering techniques developed by the PNP. The JLP won in the national media with superior jingles, attack advertisements, more extensive coverage and far more extensive paraphernalia, in particular shirts and armbands. The JLP was also able to decisively win the financing battle with what many felt was an unprecedented war chest of money. This was used for a lavish media campaign but also to cover the island with billboards. Comrades in many constituencies pointed to the widespread buying of votes by the JLP (a common method of distribution was the folded JLP tee-shirt with \$1,000 or more inside), and instances of PNP supporters being paid amounts of \$5,000 and upwards not to vote. Greater research will have to explain why the Private Sector deserted the Party in large numbers, despite being the collective beneficiary of so many programmes and enjoying over a decade of sustained profitability brought about by the deregulation of the economy and macroeconomic stability.

5.2 Violence

There is a strong feeling coming from certain constituencies that violence continues to play a critical if under-reported role in national elections. Described as “surgical violence”, it takes the form of targeting violence against critical PNP strongholds in marginal constituencies close to Election Day, to intimidate or demoralize voters. Examples of this were:

- (i) the drive-by shootings of the candidate’s campaign vehicle at a bar in Georges Valley (Central Manchester) which killed four Comrades on the Friday night before the election, followed by
- (ii) a further shooting of two Comrades of the leading PNP family in Comfort (Central Manchester) late in the night on the eve of the election,
- (iii) a spate of shootings in August Town (East St. Andrew) which led to numerous PNP voters leaving the community shortly before Election Day,
- (iv) widespread shooting and roadblocks in several communities in West Central St. Andrew on the Sunday night before Election Day which carried on right up to the opening of the polls, and

(v) sustained violence against PNP communities in South-East St. Andrew. In other instance there was intimidation, where strange men appeared and made threats or simply drove around in cars, which proved effective in frightening many people (particularly in rural areas).

5.3 The Voters List and the EOJ.

There are strong and persistent views that there were real problems with the Voters List. The most common complaints are that many people were re-verified but their names did not end up on the final Voters List, and that the List given out by the EOJ in the run-up to the elections (on which the Party canvassed and the Voters Guides were prepared) was altered in the final List by the removal of the names of numerous PNP supporters and the shifting of supporters to other polling divisions. There were also complaints that the List that PNP candidates and their agents had was different from what was in the black book; that people who had migrated and been struck off the list reappeared.

A strongly held view among Comrades on the ground is that the EOJ was biased in favour of the JLP, a perception that was strengthened by some of public remarks made by the Director of Elections (e.g. his remark that all JLP candidates were lawfully nominated, notwithstanding the constitutional issue). What is, however, also accepted is that the PNP effort at enumeration was inadequate the Party dropped the ball during the Presidential election and its aftermath, while the JLP was doing detailed enumeration work). It appears that the Party has not yet come to grips with putting in place mechanisms to cope effectively with the relatively new system of continuous enumeration.

6.0 THE CAMPAIGN

In an election such as this that turned out to be remarkably close despite the expectations and predictions of certain analysts, pollsters and some members of the public, general factors cannot give the entire picture.

We therefore determined to do a more detailed study of a number of constituencies where the results were interesting, unusual and hopefully would reveal more insights and details than what the general picture showed. A sample of 12 constituencies was decided upon to represent most if not all of the factors that were at play and influenced the outcome of the elections.

These were: NW St. Ann
Western St. Mary
Eastern St. Andrew
South East St. Andrew
West Central St. Andrew
South East St. Catherine
North Clarendon
North Central Clarendon
Central Manchester
South East St. Elizabeth
East Hanover
West Central St. James

We were unable to do any work in Western St. Mary, North & North Central Clarendon and South East St. Elizabeth. However the total increased to 11 after we had a meeting with campaign managers and workers representing South, South Central and Central St. Catherine.

Colin Fagan won in South East St. Catherine, despite the problem of the toll road and the determination of the JLP to win that seat; Peter Bunting won in Central Manchester, despite the party trailing in the polls up until his entry in the constituency in May, 2007; Trevor Munroe lost in Eastern St Andrew, despite his positive poll results leading up to the election; D. K. Duncan pulled off a narrow victory in East Hanover, getting 878 more votes for the PNP than in 2002, despite his age & returning to active politics after years of semi-retirement. Francis Tulloch returned to politics as well and got 1236 more votes than the PNP did in 2002, yet lost the seat.

Patrick Roberts lost in West Central St. Andrew, “the war zone” even after getting 439 more votes than in 2002. Maxine Henry-Wilson won with a reduced majority after an amazing campaign

against one of politics' most violent prone candidates. Sharon Hay-Webster increased her majority by 1663 in South Central St. Catherine after having a well managed campaign. Natalie Neita Headley increased the PNP vote in E C St Catherine by 1347 votes, yet had no money. Michael Whittingham, in North West St Ann was ahead at one stage according to an Anderson poll; then a massive infusion of money seemed to have turned the tables on a possible PNP win.

Apart from these detailed reviews we know that Bobby Pickersgill recovered and won his seat in North West St. Catherine and Roger Clarke won an outstanding victory in Central Westmoreland.

Some of the main reasons for these victories were:

- i. Winning candidates walked all over their constituencies, from house to house, including JLP houses
- ii. They worked tirelessly from morning to night, day after day. Colin Fagan said he “walked off three pairs of shoes” in the campaign. Natalie Neita Headley “walked her constituency for 18 months”. Peter Bunting had little sleep for weeks.
- iii. They had well managed campaigns and a team of dedicated and committed, experienced workers in the main.
- iv. They were good, credible candidates that were respected and appreciated in their constituencies
- v. Good organizational strategies and effective canvasses were carried out and the election day tasks were reasonably well done
- vi. Love for and the presence of the Party Leader in the constituency.

Some of the main reasons for not winning were:

- i. Did not target and capture sufficient young voters
- ii. Constituency organization was weak and there was an appreciable degree of dis-unity as well.
- iii. The campaign strategy was not well orchestrated or managed and communication was a problem in the constituency as well as with party central
- iv. Money overpowered almost everything else

- v. Violence, selective and targeted and intimidation also had great impact
- vi. The confusion over the final voter's lists and inefficiency of the EOJ turned away many voters.
- vii. The impressive and relentless JLP advertising campaign contrasted with the weak and unimpressive PNP advertising strategy.

Many other important reasons for the outcome of the elections are expressed in the detailed, attached commentaries on these constituencies. It is however very interesting to look at a few of the recommendations made for the future operation of the party by the workers, managers and young people with whom we spoke.

The future

Rebuild the unity within the party. The party has to work as a coordinated team to place the PNP at the forefront of the National Movement for the development of Jamaica. Specifically:

- i. more grass roots connections with the people
- ii. the establishment of a party school and a comprehensive political education programme designed to deal with the philosophy and practice of the party
- iii. a new youth programme as the Youth Organisation has become irrelevant to the needs of young people and the party at the same time.
- iv. Total restructuring and reorganization of the party so that it can function effectively as a modern organization using 21st century practices and management techniques
- v. Have to inculcate a new set of values and redefine the purpose of the party as voluntarism is dead and mercenary practices are increasing
- vi. More voter education and training especially because of continuous registration
- vii. Improved candidate selection process and better MP representation
- viii. More democracy in the party, with a new role for groups and to create a new type of party worker, trained, educated and officially recognized within the organization

A successful campaign is not captured in a single statement or act but there are commonalities that we observed:

- i. A good candidate who is respected on the ground
- ii. A united and hardworking party membership with knowledge of the voters and a willingness to work outside and beyond the election
- iii. An effective well managed organization in place to conduct an effective canvass, scientific assessments of the voters, to interface with and have house to house contact with the residents and for the fullest involvement in the enumeration exercises.
- iv. The participation, particularly in constituencies with varying social groupings of party representatives from a variety of social backgrounds
- v. The recognition of and respect for dedicated party workers who form the backbone of the party's successful achievements.
- vi. A cause to fight for and a reason to win.

See Appendix II in total appendix II.4 in particular for content of discussions at constituency sessions held with constituency workers and cluster managers.

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7.0 THE WAY FORWARD

7.1 Knowing where we are going: Unity and Philosophy

The overarching question facing the People's National Party today is how to reunite the leaders, members and supporters around a common platform, based on a shared philosophy, common sense of direction and the role of the Party in the future of the nation. The problem of distrust and consequent disunity associated with the 2006 Presidential election is not going to heal itself. A determined programme needs to be implemented that will provide the requisite spaces for a full and frank exchange of differences. The act of re-establishing frayed personal relationships is, however, only one aspect of the problem. Genuine unity must be built upon the foundations of a shared philosophy, a broadly consensual set of beliefs and a common set of policies arising from these beliefs. 'What', as one respondent asked 'is the transcendent purpose of the PNP?'

In the period after its formation and up until the 1950s, the PNP was an anti-colonial movement; indeed, it is reasonable to suggest that it was the vehicle of the national movement that struggled in a peculiarly Anglo-Caribbean sense for independence. In the seventies, Democratic Socialism was the name given to a broad-based movement headed by the PNP aimed at redressing the deeply entrenched and unequal social and economic underpinnings of post-colonial Jamaica. What are the new principles that will unite the majority of Jamaicans in a programme of social, political and economic advancement appropriate to the twenty first century? What will be the goals and objectives that arise from these principles? The question of Party unity cannot thus be approached in the abstract, but must coalesce around a set of clearly defined principles and further elaborated objectives. Then, we will truly be able to say with one voice 'We know where we are going!'

The following proposals flow from this.

7.2 The Unity Conference

- i. A series of retreats involving the President, Vice Presidents and senior officers of the Party should be convened to resolve differences, discuss matters of leadership, unity and the way forward for the PNP. The present appraisal report might be used as one available document, though the documents from earlier appraisal exercises, the *Principles and Objectives*, the Party programme and other appropriate documents might provide the basis for an informed discussion.

- ii. The establishment of a Commission with the purpose of reviewing and redrafting the Principles and Objectives of the PNP. The new Draft Principles and Objectives would be circulated for study and comments at all levels throughout the Party.
- iii. The convening of a special conference entitled, perhaps, 'the Unity Conference' in which the philosophy and the aims and objectives of the Party in the twenty first century would be the main items on the agenda.

7.3 Philosophy and Core Values

The era of globalisation and self-centred materialism has re-enforced the need for the Party to re-examine its philosophy and identify core values to guide its decision-making and actions, which will resonate with contemporary Jamaica at all levels. A *Charter of Principles* should be developed for adoption at the Unity Conference, and to provide a platform for the Party's role as leader of the next phase in the National Movement. The Charter of Principles should:

- i. Emphasize the Party's commitment to policies that recognise and seek to redress Jamaica's historical imbalances and inequities, in the quest for a just and fair society.
- ii. Reaffirm the Party's commitment to democracy and the deepening of its application at both the national and local levels.
- iii. Promote an economy that provides opportunity for all, but particularly the poor and those traditionally on the margins
- iv. Underline the party's commitment to a sustainable economy, in the context of the imminent threat to life as we know it that is posed by unsustainable practices associated with global warming
- v. Reaffirm and build on the Party's role in supporting and advancing legislation in favour of greater gender equality
- vi. Constantly focus on developing practical measures to address the social challenges of the day in a way that has the broadest beneficial impact
- vii. Embrace and celebrate Jamaica's unique capacity for tolerance, love and forgiveness
- viii. Recognise Jamaica as a place where commercial initiative and entrepreneurship is encouraged

- ix. Promote a society where acts of good citizenship are expected, recognised and encouraged at all levels
- x. Promote an economy where foreign capital is welcomed as long as it is respectful of our laws, people and environment
- xi. Recognise that roughly half of Jamaica's population is resident abroad and that there is therefore the need to build the closest possible economic and political relationships with the Diaspora
- xii. Continue the Party's tradition of promoting our Caribbean Community, particularly in the context of the difficult options facing small states in a globalised world
- xiii. Adopt the principle of Accountability for Performance as a core value within the Party
- xiv. Recognize administrative competence and capacity for hard work as core competences for organisational posts in the Party
- xv. Adopt the principle of Accountability for Financial Integrity, as a core value within the Party, requiring transparency and honesty in dealings with public resources
- xvi. Recognise that corruption is a malignant condition against which the Party must at all times be vigilant, and encourage a culture of financial probity and integrity among all holders of offices within the Party
- xvii. Recognise the need for the Party to continuously review its economic and social philosophies in a dynamic and evolving world, with the objective of always developing workable frameworks for giving practical expression to the Party's core values.

7.4 Accountability for Performance

To give practical expression to this core value, the Party should develop and establish a system of annual performance reviews of holders of posts in the Party's organisational structure. This approach should be encouraged downstream through the Regional, Divisional and Group structures. When the Party is in power, it should apply this system to its representatives holding governmental positions.

The Party should also consider allocating relevant Portfolios to specific Vice Presidents and Deputy General Secretaries, to clearly establish areas of responsibility and facilitate the measurement of performance.

7.5 Incumbency & Succession Planning

The Party should recognise the dangers of institutionalising personalities and reinforcing the dominance of incumbency. A culture of upward mobility and the introduction of “new blood” should be encouraged. The Party might wish to consider the adoption of Term Limits of three consecutive terms for all Party offices (other than the Party leader while the Party is in power), and implement such Term Limits with no grandfathering of incumbents. The Term Limits rule could be modified to provide for resumed eligibility after the end of one term from the expiration of the Term Limit.

The Party should concentrate on succession planning as a priority. Young people need to see a career path in politics to become interested in it. Openings, opportunities and promotions have to be created to keep interest high amongst members, to keep the Party invigorated and to overcome staleness and a lack of enthusiasm for its ideals. Retired officers and members of the Party who have the required experience and appropriate skills should be co-opted to sit on Party commissions and committees or be deployed as consultants and advisors to the Party. More experienced members of the Party have to be recognized and encouraged to train, advise and pass on their skills and knowledge to younger Party members and supporters to maintain the party's successful growth.

A new culture has to be fashioned whereby all members of the party are encouraged to understudy and to replace party leaders as a matter of course and not as a matter of challenging anyone's authority or position.

7.6 Internal Affairs/Disciplinary matters

The role of the Disciplinary Committee should be expanded and re-invented as a mechanism for encouraging internal unity and cohesion within the Party. It might be called the Committee for Internal Affairs and Disciplinary matters. Its mandate would include:

- i. Building consensus around the Party's Core Values
- ii. Encouraging mutual support among Party officers at all levels
- iii. Identifying violations of core values and, where appropriate, imposing proportionate consequences on transgressors

- iv. Ensuring that potential embarrassments to the Party's image and reputation are identified early and managed appropriately to mitigate political damage.

Any recognized Party organ might also refer disputes among Comrades at the local level to this Committee for resolution. This Committee should be empowered to issue Party Directives which are binding on Party members. Retired senior officers of the Party, who have the required experience and appropriate skills, should be co-opted to sit on this Committee.

7.7 Party Structures

It is time to re-think the nature and purpose of groups in the Party. There is a widespread feeling that the group structure is in decline and needs to be brought back to the fore. What should the Party group in the twenty first century look like? How might it address questions of community advancement and economic empowerment in ways that might attract young people from all social strata? How might the group structure be utilised to encourage the flow of ideas, criticisms and recommendations from Party workers at the divisional, constituency and community levels? This might be an additional item sufficiently important to occupy thoughts at the 'Unity Conference'. At minimum, all group members should be enumerated to vote at national elections.

Other items of critical importance include:

- i. The Party secretariat needs to re-examine its role and methods of communicating with party members and the public so as to erase the feeling amongst many "that dem own the Party".
- ii. The Party leader's support staff needs to be strengthened, reconfigured and take up a new role of managing the use of the leader's time more effectively, see to proper scheduling, and prepare for the leaders necessary needs and requirements whilst working for the Party. The Party Leader's staff must ensure that all requests for appointments, correspondence and meetings are dealt with speedily and professionally. The road programmes and campaign activities of the Party leadership need to be more professionally coordinated and managed.
- iii. The General Secretary should be employed full time on Party work, and not at the same time be an MP and/or Minister.

- iv. There should be a single Campaign Director of National Elections, appointed by the Executive to be in charge of the Party's entire campaign organisation, to create a clear path of decision-making authority.
- v. The Treasurer should be primarily the Party's chief accounting officer, and should be buttressed by the Party Fundraising Committee (of which the Treasurer would be a member).
- vi. The present bifurcation of the PNPYO and Patriots needs to be rethought. Perhaps the Party needs to abandon both and establish new look youth organizations with fresh credentials and a clean break with the recent past. The Party might wish to consider establishing a PNP Students Association specifically to focus on the recruitment and mobilisation of tertiary-level students; and a PNP Young Professionals Association to focus on the recruitment and mobilisation of young professionals and entrepreneurs. At least one senior Party member should be on the executive of each of these organisations, to provide appropriate guidance and mentoring and to encourage adherence to the Party's Core Values.
- vii. The Women's Movement, which is moribund, also needs to be reinvented. The PNPWM, which was in the vanguard to implement the Maternity Leave Law and other path breaking legislation in the seventies, is now a shadow of its former self. It should be a catalyst for recruiting and mobilising sympathetic volunteers who will actively support:
- ✓ community programmes which empower women;
 - ✓ new legislation and activism to address the severe gender imbalances that continue in Jamaica; and
 - ✓ campaign committees at the national, constituency and divisional levels in national and local election campaigns. The head of the Women's Movement should, as in the past, be an active **national** spokesperson for the Party on gender affairs.

7.8 Enumeration of Supporters

It is apparent that the Party's management of the EOJ's recently introduced continuous enumeration process is ineffective, with the result that many PNP supporters were not on the voters lists for the recent General Election. Enumeration of supporters is a crucial factor in

election outcomes, and the Party needs to put in place the necessary machinery to ensure the maximum possible level of enumeration of supporters on a continuous basis. An officer (perhaps one of the Deputy General Secretaries) should be allocated specific responsibility for overall management of the Party's island-wide continuous enumeration effort, with Regional Chairmen (or Vice Presidents, if our proposal in 7.4 above is adopted). Further, each MP/Caretaker should be given specific enumeration targets and required to submit regular enumeration reports.

7.9 Internal Management Capability

There should be an urgent review of the management and administrative structures of the Party, with a view to improving their efficiency and effectiveness. Modern management structures, processes and practices should be adopted, and the use of technology needs to be strengthened. The physical plant at Party Headquarters is in disrepair and needs to be substantially redesigned and renovated:

- i. to streamline and maximise the use of the available space,
- ii. to promote an image consistent with that of a modern, forward-thinking organisation, and
- iii. to allow for the efficient execution of work activities.

7.10 Party Elections

- i. Nominations to all officer positions in the Party should be received 90 days before Annual Conference.
- ii. There should be clear limits on campaign expenditure, to avoid “donor exhaustion” negatively affecting the Party’s financing for subsequent General Elections. This will also set the pattern that the Party advocates at the national level.
- iii. Funds for internal campaigns should be raised centrally by the Party and disbursed to candidates in a transparent manner, to ensure equal financial treatment of candidates.
- iv. There should be no national media campaigning, as this has the proven capacity to inflate the stakes, ‘wash dirty linen in public’, create deep resentments and provide limitless ammunition for the opposition.
- v. The existing Code of Conduct should be reviewed and adjusted to the extent necessary to be consistent with these recommendations.

- vi. The Constitution should require the Committee of Internal Affairs to play an active role in monitoring the campaign for compliance with the Code of Conduct and issuing appropriate directives on a timely basis to candidates found to be in breach.
- vii. Candidates should be required to promptly and publicly disassociate themselves from breaches of the Code of Conduct on the part of their supporters.

7.11 Candidate Selection

The system of candidate selection needs to be improved:

- i. There should be a Director of Internal Elections, with responsibility for developing and managing internal election processes and ensuring the integrity of all internal Party elections;
- ii. The emphasis should be on finding a speedy resolution to conflicts at the constituency level, followed by a structured process of reconciliation to achieve the fullest possible buy-in from all contenders and supporters.
- iii. The timeframe for the appointment of candidates needs to be truncated, to allow for early selection and the longest possible time for the newly selected candidates to work on the ground.
- iv. A manual for new candidates needs to be developed, setting out the best practices of constituency organisation and campaign management.
- v. No constituency should be left for a prolonged period without a candidate.
- vi. No candidate, caretaker, MP or councillor should be permitted to abandon a constituency without a period of smooth transition.

7.12 Fundraising

- i. A Party Fundraising Committee should be established, chaired by the Treasurer.
- ii. It should be mandated to pursue strategic and coordinated fundraising initiatives on a continual basis to fund the Party's activities and campaigns.
- iii. Sympathetic private sector representatives with acknowledged fundraising capacity should be co-opted to the Party Fundraising Committee.

- iv. There should be a Committee member whose responsibility is to foster fundraising relationships with sympathetic overseas political movements and Diaspora groups.
- v. The engagement of a professional fundraiser, perhaps working on a commission basis, should be explored.
- vi. Each constituency should have at least one person, who is a trained grants proposal writer. S/he would assist combined groups who are registered as a Community Based Organisation to access funds from foundations etc.
- vii. There should be an established linkage between the Party Fundraising Committee and the Party officer in charge of Media/PR (see 7.15 below), with the mandate of promoting cohesion and avoiding incompatibilities between the Party's imaging in the media and the Party's ongoing financing efforts.

7.13 Political Education & Training

The Party must re-establish a programme for Continuing Political Education & Training, and the Party should establish the post of Director of Continuing Political Education within the Constitution of the Party with responsibility for developing and maintaining the programme. Appropriate person(s) should be charged with the task of assisting the Director with the development of a curriculum including, perhaps, courses such as:

- *The Constitution, Rules and Procedures of the Peoples National Party*
- *Core Principles of the Peoples National Party*
- *Achievements of the Peoples National Party in Government*
- *History of Jamaican Politics from 1938 to date*
- *Ethics in Government*
- *Ethics of Political Campaigning*
- *The Caribbean in the Global Political Economy*
- *Establishing and Maintaining Effective Structures of Political Organisation*
- *Maximizing Available Resources in Political Campaigns*
- *Political Public Relations and Media Management*

Guest tutors/lecturers (and authors of appropriate courses) would include experts at critical aspects of political organisation. The Party would formally certify the Continuing Political Education courses. All officers of the Party would be required to pursue the courses until certified, and qualification of a Certified Political Organiser (CPO) would eventually become a requirement in order to hold an office, serve as campaign manager, cluster manager and all other levels within the Party. The completion of refresher courses every 5 years should be encouraged among all Party officers.

7.14 Internal Communications

The Rising Sun should be revived as a Party communication tool to:

- i. counter adverse propaganda, media hostility and negative publicity
- ii. inform Comrades at all levels of the Party (including, via the Groups, the communities all around Jamaica) of immediate and ongoing issues of the day, the Party's position on those issues and the arguments in support of the Party's position
- iii. highlight the weaknesses of opposing views (including race/class or other biases, double standards, ironies, logical flaws and errors of information)

The publication should include cartoons, jokes and other potent ancillary weapons of political competition, and some non-political content of a developmental/morale-building nature. It should also be a useful tuition/revision tool in the Continuing Political Education process. The Party should encourage and utilize telecom and web-based methods of distribution of information within the Party, from the Central to the Local levels and vice versa, and undertake a programme to improve capacities in this regard. An initial objective should be to reach the point where each Group has a computer with internet/email access.

7.15 Media Relations

The Party needs to establish mechanisms for handling the Media and promoting effective Public Relations. The Party should establish the post of Director of Media Relations, with responsibility for fostering and maintaining good relationships with the media and managing the flow of information from the Party to the media. The Director should be supported by a Committee of sympathetic External Media Experts, formally appointed by the Party, who provide the Director with guidance and advice on an ongoing basis.

7.16 International Relations

The Party should review and develop strategies for enhancing relationships with compatible overseas political organisations. There is a perception that in recent times, some of these relationships have been neglected, to the Party's detriment. The post of Director of International Political Relations should be established within the Party, with the mandate of fostering ongoing technical assistance and funding support from these sources.

7.17 Recruitment

The Party needs to address recruitment from all sectors of the society, but priority must be on the young, the middle class, the stable working class, young farmers and professionals. The Party should have a committee, headed ideally by a member of the NEC, with the specific purpose of continually identifying and recruiting qualified and talented young people from all walks of society and from the Diaspora. From these efforts a 'Skills bank' should be developed, which must also include any volunteers who have come forward to provide assistance for the Party. The skills bank should extend to the Diaspora for maximum benefit.

7.18 Security and Intelligence

The use of "surgical violence" against the Party in the recent General Elections shows that this has been fine-tuned as a deliberate and effective strategy to intimidate Party workers and supporters, especially in marginal or "battle ground" constituencies. The Party needs to establish a Security & Intelligence mechanism to:

- i. Anticipate, identify and respond to threats of surgical violence as early as possible
- ii. Foster and maintain relationships within the JCF/JDF to provide effective security reactions to such threats
- iii. Mobilise support from strong Comrades to shore up areas of vulnerability and mitigate the negative effects of intimidatory tactics on the ground.

7.19 Constitutional Review

Some of these proposals may require amendments to the Party's Constitution to enable their formal adoption. A review of the Constitution by appropriate personnel should be commissioned with a view to identifying and draft any amendments, bye-laws and procedures that may be required.

8.0 EXTERNAL ASPECTS

8.1 Campaign Finance Reform

The Party needs to pursue the reform of Campaign Financing for National Elections at parliamentary and national levels as a matter of urgency. The 2007 General Elections saw the power of Big Money to subvert the political process, and Jamaican elections are once again in danger of becoming an exercise where moneyed interests have disproportionate influence, as it was before Universal Adult Suffrage in 1944. Then, one needed to have money and property in order to vote and be a candidate; now, increasingly, the property and money qualification is being reinstated for candidates, who must have deep pockets, or be supported by deep pockets, in order to even consider running for office.

The Party's ability to mobilise the support of Big Money is less than that of the JLP because of the Party's adherence to core values that will not permit back-door deals as a quid pro quo for funding. The PNP will have to use its significant parliamentary strength to fight for the appropriate legislation to make donations transparent, place upper limits on individual donations and grant equal, subsidized access to the media among other measures. The media and civil society need to be brought on board to support the principle of a system of campaign financing that addresses the anti-democratic influence of Big Money.

8.2 The EOJ and the Voters List

It is clear that the Party's enumeration efforts in recent years have been woefully inadequate. However, the persistence of reports of irregularity and unfairness in the Voters List suggests that there may be serious flaws in Jamaica's electoral machinery that need urgently to be cleaned up, or that a more substantive overhaul of the EOJ is required. The Party can only arrive at a determination of this after a careful constituency-by-constituency exercise to determine to what extent the anecdotal reports of misfeasance in relation to the Voters List are in fact real. To the extent that such a review provides reason to believe that the electoral system has organisational or structural weaknesses that are prejudicial to the Party, then it needs to bring the required pressure to bear on the EOJ to have these satisfactorily addressed and corrected.

9.0 CONCLUSION

As indicated in the preface, this is a time for healing, reinvention and renewal. The experiences that we have had in compiling this report have made us even more convinced of this. We have unearthed the same sentiments from members and supporters of the Party, at all levels. The common wish is that this report will not be tabled and allowed to gather dust, but instead will be seriously considered, acted on and serve as a useful tool in the process of the re-building and renewal of the People's National Party. We do not wish this document to be regarded merely as an academic exercise or management treatise. We wish it to be regarded as a living document which might help to breathe new life into the People's National Party and thereby into Jamaica land we love.

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